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INTRODUCTION
There has been no shortage of villains in the financial crisis which began in Asia and has now
encompassed all major emerging markets: bankers, regulators, hedge funds and the IMF have
all been excoriated for incompetence and immorality. This paper argues that the problems
which have emerged from the crisis are structural, i.e., they arise from the very nature of
financial activity. While the structural problems have been present from the beginnings of
finance, the advance of technology and of globalization has so exacerbated the problems as to
undermine the foundations of the international market order. To highlight the structural
nature of the problems, this paper will eschew the search for villains and examine the
theoretical basis for the globalization of financial markets — the major direction of their
recent evolution. Economic theory identifies major difficulties in the presumption that this
drive will lead to socially desirable outcomes. The financial crisis can be understood as the
exacerbation of these difficulties by globalization and the advance of information technology.
THE ORIGINS OF GLOBALIZATION
Globalization is the ultimate extension of the basic theme of microeconomics since Adam
Smith: that resources should be allocated, as far as possible, by the market rather than by the
government. Under competition, prices incorporate all the information available to the
various players, so individual choices guided by prices will bring about an allocation of
resources which is efficient, although not necessarily fair. By contrast, the government has
less information than market players and politics muddles its incentive to address individual
economic welfare.
A rigorous analysis of these claims for the “invisible hand” of markets, familiar to
economists, shows that they hold only if markets are:
(i) complete in that all goods which affect individual welfare are traded, so that all private
information and concerns about production costs and tastes are incorporated into prices,
to which other market players respond.
(ii) competitive in that no player can manipulate prices through its market power.
Conversely, a market economy could allocate resources inefficiently if some markets are:
(i) incomplete, e.g., if a polluting firm does not have to pay the full social cost of its
pollution.
(ii) natural monopolies in that scale economies can be achieved only by a firm which is large
relative to the market, so that it can determine prices, e.g., a railway and a utility.
This analysis led to the view that such “market failures” called for government regulation,
e.g., to impose pollution standards or control the prices charged by a natural monopoly.
In the 1970's economists argued that government attempts to correct market failures could be
counter-productive because of the following forms of “government failure”:
(i) Regulatory capture, whereby the regulated industry dominates the regulatory authority by
lobbying, influencing appointments, and overwhelming it with tendentious information,
thereby securing decisions which exclude competitors, carve up the market and increase
the profits of the incumbents.
(ii) Rent seeking by interest groups who manipulate prices via the political system.
(iii)Public choice exercised through government agencies with their own agendas, such as
maximizing salaries, perquisites and bureaucratic empires.
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These arguments shifted the professional consensus toward deregulation, i.e., abandoning
attempts to regulate fair outcomes, instead regulating to ensure a fair competitive process
thereby expanding the scope and effectiveness of market forces. The deregulation movement
held that monopolies should be controlled by making markets contestable by new entrants;
externalities should be controlled by issuing tradable licenses to pollute.
The 1980's saw an ideological shift from redistributive taxation which distorted work
incentives. Here also, the role of government came to be viewed as ensuring equality of
opportunity, rather than equality of outcome. The 1980's also saw governments retreat from
Keynesian macroeconomic intervention, as its inflationary consequences became
incorporated into the expectations of market players, thereby undermining any short-term
gains in employment. Governments largely accepted the Monetarist prescription that
macroeconomic policy should be confined to aligning growth of the money supply with long-
term real growth, thereby ensuring a stable price level.
The above consensus on expanding of the scope of the market and narrowing that of
government within a country was powerfully reinforced by the globalization of business
activities. On a global scale, there was room for competition amongst a number of large
players in industries such as autos and aircraft manufacturing. Thus, global competition could
reconcile scale economies with competitive markets. More generally, globalization captured
the gains from the international division of labour and brought new producers onto world
markets.
As governments saw the benefits of international investment, global competition for capital
led to a reduction in tax rates on capital. This competition also drove governments to adopt
stable macroeconomic policies to maintain credibility with international investors. East Asia
became the success story of goods markets globalization as international competition for
legitimacy led its authoritarian governments to pursue economic growth. However, the region
eventually fell victim to the globalization of capital markets. The next three sections identify
the special features of financial instruments, institutions and markets which prevent market
forces from bringing about a coherent, socially efficient outcome.
INCREASING RETURNS TO PRIMARY INVESTORS
The intertemporal exchange of money characteristic of finance creates its distinctive problem:
the enforcement of obligations for future payments. Debtors with obligations which are large
relative to their lifetime earnings/assets will default. This reality is acknowledged in the law
of bankruptcy which forces creditors to bear the risk of non-repayment when the debtor's total
obligations exceed the value of his attachable assets. Similarly, limited liability forces a
corporation's creditors to bear the risk of non-repayment when its total debt exceeds the value
of its equities. Recognizing this, debtors typically limit their loans to what can be secured by
equity, plus a cushion to allow for the costs of seizing the collateral.
When the value of the equity falls below the value of the debt, residual downside risk is
shifted onto the debt holders. This creates "increasing returns" to risky gambles: doubling a
gamble increases its expected return if the gambler would capture the doubled upside but is
not liable for the doubled downside risk beyond the loss of his equity. Such increasing returns
undermine a basic requirement for markets to bring about a coherent, socially efficient
outcome.
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INCREASING RETURNS TO FINANCIAL FIRMS
Scale economies in financial transactions arise as follows:
Information discovery and processing. Once a system for discovering and processing
information has been set up, the additional cost of handling a higher volume of information is
small. This is true, for example, for the costs of forecasting the performance of corporations,
evaluating the creditworthiness of counter-parties, valuing financial instruments, monitoring
market information, and processing and internally disseminating information.
Internal generation of information from discovering patterns in existing information flows is
enhanced when those flows can be tapped from a more diverse range of sources.
The application of existing information to activities larger in scale and wider in scope
requires a less-than-proportional scaling up of input costs. Thus, an existing information
processing system can be applied to a wider range of related activities, such as portfolio
management, arbitrage, retail banking, investment banking, proprietary trading, IPO's.
Risk pooling. The overall riskiness of portfolio with a given expected return can be reduced
by diversifying it across financial instruments whose returns are less than perfectly correlated.
Since transaction costs limit the gains from diversification, an institution large enough to
enjoy scale economies in transactions can enjoy greater risk pooling.
Internal transactions. Activity in a broad range of markets creates opportunities to profit from
internal trading which nets out assets and liabilities, income and expenditure.
Reputation and Access to Credit. In principle, a given dollar of equity can support a loan only
once, since the next lender should set off against existing equity any prior exposure to loans.
However, complex balance sheets are costly to scrutinize, understand and monitor; large
changes in creditworthiness can occur quickly. This leads creditors to rely upon the
borrower's reputation. Unlike equity, reputation can be used repeatedly, in that several
inattentive lenders can be induced to make loans based an institution's reputation: given such
lenders, reputation is like a fixed factor, hence a source of scale economies.
While these informational economies of scale facilitate expansion in size and scope, the
expansion itself can enhance perceived creditworthiness if the debtor is seen as “too big to
fail” and thus enjoys an implicit government guarantee or if one set of creditors assumes that
the debtor would not default on their loans because this would jeopardize its other activities.
Informational economies of scale mean that financial transactions are typically not between
primary savers and investors but are delegated to financial firms:
Fund management is based on scale economies in transactions, risk pooling, and discovering
and processing information.
Arbitrage exploits discrepancies in the relative pricing of portfolios with related payoff
streams. Once the informational costs of identifying the discrepancies has been incurred,
arbitrageurs maximize their profits by applying this information to the maximum volume of
transactions. Thus, it pays for large groups of primary investors to appoint specialist agents to
find and exploit pricing discrepancies.
Intermediation is based on scale economies in information processing, such that primary
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savers and investors find indirect financial transactions via the intermediary cheaper than
direct transactions with each other.
THE PRINCIPAL/AGENT PROBLEM IN FINANCE
All firms must motivate their agents (employees) to act on behalf of the principals (owners).
Implicit in the reliance upon market forces to integrate the decisions of many consumers and
firms into a coherent, efficient whole is the presumption that this integration has been
achieved within firms, i.e., that they have solved the principal/agent problem. Asymmetry of
information between principal and agent means that agent incentives must be based upon
performance measures which the principal can observe or infer, which can conflict with their
efficient sharing of risk. In manufacturing, asymmetry of information and the riskiness of
observable measures of agent performance are not so severe as to jeopardize the effectiveness
of market forces in organizing the economy as a whole . However, in finance, the only reason
a principal employs an agent is to process information on his behalf. Therefore, asymmetry in
information is not peripheral to their relationship, but constitutes its economic basis.
Furthermore, the link between the fundamentals of effort and ability and observable measures
of absolute performance, such as the return to capital, is subject to so much randomness that
rewards based on these measures would introduce intolerable riskiness into the agent's
payoffs, undermining their effectiveness as incentives. Therefore, an agent's rewards are
typically based upon his performance relative to the average performance of his peers, as
measured, for example, by the average returns on the class of assets under management.
Relative performance also determines the flow of funds to be managed by the agent, which
also has a major impact on his payoffs. The following sections argue that these features of
incentive structures in finance exacerbate herd behaviour by agents, distort their risk
incentives and preclude their consideration of long-term fundamentals
FUND MANAGEMENT
Financial markets are vulnerable to herd behaviour, in which traders respond in lockstep to a
small set of signals with only a tenuous relationship to fundamentals. The underlying reason
is the scale economies in processing information about the quality of financial assets and
about the business fundamentals that determine their future returns. Those primary investors
who trade on their own account usually operate on too small a scale to incur these costs: they
try to infer the information that has been discovered by larger players from movements in
asset prices. Thus, they rationally choose to follow trends, leading to herd behaviour. This
makes small primary investors vulnerable to manipulation by those who trade on a scale large
enough to move asset prices.
Most primary investors, burdened with other calls on their time and energy, delegate their
daily investment decisions to fund management firms. While passive funds have attracted an
increasing share of funds, their expansion is inherently self-limiting since it raises the
potential returns to active fund management. Below, I point out that firms active in fund
management are inherently unstable, so that it is rational for primary investors to choose
amongst them on the basis of their short-term performance. This short-term focus, mediated
by investment advisors and financial analysts, forces a short-term focus on the fund managers
which leads to them to herd also.
Fundamental research provides a basis for predicting the performance of a firm which faces
stable trends in input and output markets and has a stable organizational structure and culture.
These conditions are usually present in a manufacturing firm: much of the knowledge and
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skills of its core employees have value mainly within the firm, so there is little scope for rapid
changes in the core which would destabilize its performance. By contrast, the performance of
an investment fund depends on the skills and teamwork of its core analysts. These
"fundamentals" are highly unstable, indeed, inherently self-destructive:
(i) Analytical skills are not specific to a fund management company, but can be used
anywhere with access to the same information flows. Hence, analysts who have made
their reputation from successfully managing one fund can set up their own company or
be bid away by other funds desperate to improve their mediocre performance before
investors defect.
(ii) A successful fund tends to attract new investors, which hinders repeat performances as
the fund grows large enough to affect prices. Its investment style attracts imitators who
bid away the supernormal gains from using that style.
(iii) Within a fund management team, a few key decisions leading to spectacular success
confer not only massive bonuses but also status and power — which, however, can
vanish as markets turn. In a high-stakes, high-pressure environment with endless scope
for backbiting, second guessing and finger pointing, there can be abrupt deterioration in
the personal chemistry amongst star managers, self-selected for their aggression and
world-class egos. Overnight switches of allegiance to other funds are the common result.
Given such unstable "fundamentals" in fund management, it is rational for primary investors
to focus on short-term fund performance, a tendency supported by the psychological
predisposition to give excessive weight to the most recent data.
To choose amongst funds, primary investors turn to fund salesmen and financial analysts who
provide "scientific" advice by tabulating relative fund performance as the best available
measure of fund managers’ effort and ability. Good relative performance attracts new
investors and defections from other funds. This is true even of money invested through
pension plans because their trustees seek to shift liability for fund performance by selecting
managed funds on the recommendations of financial analysts, inevitably based on relative
fund performance. The upshot is that fund managers must focus on relative short-term
performance because this determines money flows across funds, hence their incomes and job
security.
Even if a trader plans to sell in five minutes, he cares about the expected price at that time,
which, in turn depends on the expected price five minutes hence, etc. Therefore, even short-
horizon traders would trade on long-run fundamentals, provided that they give equal weight
to upside and downside risk, i.e., they are risk neutral with respect to the value of their
portfolio at the end of their trading horizon. This is not the case when a poor relative short-
term performance can cost the fund manager his reputation, funds under management and
perhaps his job. For example, during the U.S. bull market leading up to October 1987, the
consensus amongst fund managers was that the market was more likely to go down than up.
However, few managers wanted to sell their holdings. If the market did continue to go up,
they would be perceived as lone fools for having missed out on the ride. On the other hand, in
the (more likely) event of a market decline, they would not look very bad if most other
managers made the same mistake.
The focus on short-term relative performance also undermines the incentive to carry out
fundamental analysis. A trader must focus on signals which help him predict short-term price
changes, signals which need have little to do with long-term fundamentals, so long as they are
regarded as important by other traders who subsequently impound them into the price within
the first trader's planning horizon. Thus, all traders might rationally choose to ignore signals
which influenced fundamental values beyond their planning horizon, instead focussing on
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those few signals which conventional wisdom views as driving the market in the short-term,
even if the data were unreliable and bore little relationship to long-term fundamentals.
In summary, herd behaviour by fund managers is inherent in the use of market incentives to
motivate them to process fundamental information which is costly to acquire and use. The
problem will only become worse as savings are increasingly invested through privately-
chosen fund management firm which compete for the savings.
ARBITRAGE
Arbitrage originally meant the search for riskless profit opportunities from discrepancies in
the pricing of a given asset in two different markets. As these opportunities were exploited
with the advance of information technology and the consequent fall in transaction costs,
arbitrageurs moved on to exploit price discrepancies between complex portfolios of assets
with similar payoff structures by shorting the overpriced portfolio while taking a long
position in the underpriced portfolio. This permits high leverage of capital with the possibility
of high returns, plus a high risk of loss of capital. Since arbitrageurs derive their returns from
their nimbleness in responding to rapidly-evolving market opportunities by adjustments of
complex portfolios, their balance sheets and capital adequacy are impossible for creditors and
regulators to monitor on a day-to-day basis. The danger is always present of their capital
being wiped out, shifting downside risk to creditors and counter-parties and motivating the
arbitrageurs to take ever-riskier positions.
Advances in technology drive the technological cost of information processing systems ever
lower. This leaves as the key cost the payoffs to individuals with the intellectual skills to
integrate flows of data into mathematical models to yield useful conclusions. Moreover, the
advance of technology permits lower-level skills to be replaced by computer models and
permits programme trading to arbitrage away supernormal profits from any stable, predictable
economic relationships. This raises the relative value of higher-order skills: the ability to see
new patterns beyond what can be captured in existing models and to capture them in new
models. To attract, retain and motivate agents with these increasingly-scarce skills, financial
firms must offer rewards which are strongly performance-related on the upside, while limiting
exposure to the downside risk of their trading positions, which is borne by the firm and
ultimately by its shareholders and creditors. This exacerbates the risk-seeking tendencies of
arbitrage firms noted above, while forcing them to place ever-larger bets on complex,
inherently speculative, conjectures about the future evolution of financial markets.
Large pools of capital to underwrite arbitrage activity can be assembled from risk-seeking
investors from around the world. Banks provide credit to the arbitrageurs to gain exposure to
the high potential returns without jeopardizing their own creditworthiness by direct
association with arbitrage activities. However, short-term market movements which lead to
poor short-term returns can trigger withdrawals of risk capital by disappointed primary
investors, withdrawals of credit lines by alarmed banks and margin calls from alarmed
regulators, forcing the arbitrageur to liquidate positions designed to exploit long-term
fundamentals. Thus, like fund managers, arbitrageurs must focus, not on the long-term but on
short-term relative performance. Consequently, they are also prone to herd behaviour.
INTERMEDIATION
Financial intermediaries specialize in assessing credit risk and monitoring debtor's balance
sheet to forestall perverse risk seeking behaviour, exploiting informational economies of
Young: The Globalization of Financial Markets 7
scale which are unavailable to small savers. They discourage excessive leverage (a high ratio
of debt to equity) by charging a higher risk premium on loans to borrowers who are already
highly leveraged. However, this economic role makes the intermediary itself liable to risk
seeking. Since its creditors cannot operate on a scale to monitor its balance sheet effectively,
its own cost of credit need not rise with leverage. In these circumstances, maximizing the
return on equity requires the intermediary to leverage to the maximum extent permitted by the
regulatory authorities.
Expansion of a manufacturing firm against competitors requires creating distinctive new
products and/or price cuts which would show up immediately on the bottom line. By contrast,
financial intermediaries can easily expand to the limits of their permitted leverage because
deposits at all intermediaries are viewed as identical except for perceived credit risk, so it can
compete for funds to finance an expansion by offering depositors a higher interest rate, while
relaxing lending standards and charging higher rates to borrowers. Deterioration in asset
quality can be masked for some time by rolling over loans and lending more money to
borrowers to maintain the illusion that their loans are performing. The problems will not
surface until an economic downturn creates liquidity problems by reducing the flow of
deposits.
The business of an intermediary is hold a portfolio of offsetting assets and liabilities; typically
each side of its balance sheet is large relative to its net worth. Having been leveraged to the
maximum extent permitted by the regulatory authorities, its equity base can be eliminated by
falls in the values of its loans if its monitoring systems are inadequate or if there are
economic setbacks in the sectors where its loans are concentrated. Then the intermediary has
an incentive to seek risky gambles with upside potential before its creditors awaken to their
exposure. Thus, financial intermediaries are structurally prone to risk seeking.
Amongst intermediaries, banks are special because a subclass of their liabilities — deposits
— serves as the dominant medium of exchange in a modern economy. To protect the
economy against loss of confidence in this medium of exchange, governments provide
explicit or implicit guarantees to bank depositors. This guarantee further shifts downside risk
from the bank's creditors (depositors) to the general public. The guarantee is strongest (and
the shift greatest) for the banks which are “too big to fail”, i.e., which are so large that their
failure would cause a general loss of confidence, threatening systemic collapse. The guarantee
provides free deposit insurance and reduces the interemediary’s incentive to control the
riskiness of its loans since this will not raise the cost of attracting deposits.
These risk-seeking tendencies in a financial intermediary are exacerbated by the
principal/agent problem of motivating top management to act in the interests of shareholders.
An expansion of both deposits and loans to the limits permitted by the regulations on capital
adequacy benefits top management by fuelling an expansion of their salaries, perquisites and
status. They do not bear the downside risk of the loss of equity value of the intermediary, let
alone the losses to the general public beyond that point. Asymmetry in information is severe
because top managers will be aware of the capital adequacy position long before shareholders
and are even further insulated from liability, so they are prone to seek risk to resuscitate
balance sheets and maintain their positions and perquisites.
Informational economies encourage financial intermediaries to expand into proprietary trade
and arbitrage. Any institution with a large, stable cash flow from retail intermediation can
“rent” its reputation to a subsidiary bearing its name. With the resulting access to cash and
credit, the subsidiary can take large arbitrage positions. Given the perverse incentives created
Young: The Globalization of Financial Markets 8
by bankruptcy and limited liability noted above, this implies that financial intermediaries
have a structural propensity to exploit and, therefore jeopardize, their creditworthiness in a
drive to expand the scale, scope and leverage of their arbitrage activities. Competition for
capital forces them to do so.
NATIONAL REGULATION
Because of the above considerations, even the modest objective of levelling the financial
playing field requires extensive regulatory intervention:
(i) Setting up circuit breakers to guard against herd behaviour and speculative bubbles.
(ii) Detecting and punishing collusion, insider trading and price manipulation.
(iii) Imposing capital adequacy standards to anticipate risk seeking by financial
intermediaries.
(iv) Licensing brokers and dealers and imposing margin requirements in derivatives markets
to limit counter-party and settlement risk.
(v) Serving as lender of last resort to forestall systemic collapse.
To achieve these objectives, an effective regulatory authority requires the following internal
mechanisms:
(i) Systems to record information in real time within a consistent framework which
facilitates crosschecking and provides timely signals of tenuous capital adequacy.
(ii) Economic expertise to process and interpret information, and respond to new
developments in financial markets, instruments and incentives.
(iii) A professional career structure to attract and retain high quality personnel: competitive
salaries, job security, and avenues for exit into careers which are sufficiently separated
from the regulated industry to avoid distortion of regulatory decisions.
(iv) Safeguards against bureaucratic inefficiency and corruption.
(v) A convincing ideological framework to sustain regulator morale and commitment in the
face of threats and bribes.
An effective regulatory authority also requires external institutional support:
(i) An accounting profession with the procedures to define and impose professional
standards, so that balance sheets reveal the quality of loan portfolios.
(ii) A legal framework which provides regulators with statutory access to information about
balance sheets, supported by effective sanctions for distortion and delay.
(iii) Political support of regulatory goals so that regulations and judicial decisions are
enforced, not subverted by power holders.
(iv) Acquiescence by the regulated business community, so that enforcement procedures need
be invoked only in exceptional cases.
Only a few countries meet the above conditions for effective regulation of financial activity
within their borders. Building a “new global financial architecture” which meets these
conditions at a global level remains a daunting challenge, given the problems of organizing
the timely international collation of financial data, establishing the credibility and authority of
global regulators to the international community, and reconciling national regulations, laws
and economic and political agendas. Meantime, severe problems arise from the multiplicity of
regulators, each with jurisdictions limited to their nationals and firms incorporated in their
nation.
Young: The Globalization of Financial Markets 9
GLOBALIZATION AND THE FRAMEWORK OF FINANCE
The globalization of finance and the international movement of capital across jurisdictions
has transformed the framework in which fund management, arbitrage and intermediation take
place.
(i) Globalization has altered the balance of power between regulators and regulated. From
being agents of the sovereign government, regulators have become players on the same level
as the entities which they regulate. By relocating the incorporation of subsidiaries, financial
firms can shift activities outside the jurisdiction of regulators who impose costs which are too
high relative to the private benefits which the regulation brings. Therefore, regulators are
constrained by concern that stringent regulation will lead to an exodus of capital and
corporate headquarters, with damaging consequences for their economies.
(ii) Informational economies of scale have become even more significant when a financial
firm can extend its operations globally. Thus, globalization has given a further advantage to
large firms, whose reputations permit access to large credit lines and whose technology for
information processing and management is readily extended to more countries.
(iii) Globalization has introduced another class of assets into financial markets: currencies.
Exchange rates between currencies added another dimension to portfolio choice, requiring the
monitoring of countries' macroeconomic fundamentals. Moreover, currencies provide an easy
target for manipulation because of their low transaction costs and the ease of stampeding
smaller players into herd behaviour.
The next sections discuss the interaction of these emerging features of the global financial
framework.
COMPETITION AMONGST REGULATORS
Corporations seek to reassure counter-parties by certification by a jurisdiction which can
enforce legal action against them. The certified corporations must be regulated by the certifier
to sustain its credibility and guard against the shift of downside risk from the certified parties.
A corporation trades off the costs of complying with the regulations against the benefits of the
certification in providing access to counter-parties when it chooses the jurisdictions where it
(i) incorporates (ii) issues financial instruments (iii) lists its financial instruments for trade.
These jurisdictions can differ from each other, and from the jurisdictions responsible for the
economies fundamental to determining the returns on the corporation's financial instruments.
With globalization, an increasing proportion of the economic activity within a nation is
through entities certified abroad. Consequently, regulators in different jurisdictions find
themselves in competition for certification business. By reducing compliance costs, light
regulation attracts certification business to a regulatory authority, but increases the risk of
major ethical lapses or large-scale defaults, which jeopardize the credibility, and hence the
value, of the certification. In this regard, a regulatory body faces tradeoffs familiar to brand
managers, such as Holiday Inn or McDonalds.
Can the invisible hand of competition between regulatory authorities ensure an optimal level
of quality control, such as we rely on competition to achieve for hotel and fast-food chains?
Competition between regulators can indeed play a useful role. Control of a brand confers
monopoly power, which can exploited to secure monopoly profits. Similarly, organized
financial markets can exploit their monopoly power by imposing a high tax on transactions.
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Competition between organized markets and the threat of entry by rival markets can be useful
in keeping transaction taxes commensurate with the regulatory authority's costs. It was
competition, or the threat of such, which forced down the trading commissions charged by the
New York Stock Exchange and the London Stock Exchange.
However, there are crucial differences between brand managers and regulatory authorities
which make it unwise to rely just upon international competition between regulatory
agencies:
(i) Regulatory authorities face the same principal/agent problems and the same perverse
incentives as those created by bankruptcy, and limited liability in the entities they regulate.
The agents of a regulatory authority capture some of the upside of light regulation which
attracts international business, since this enhances their status, salaries and bureaucratic
empires, but bear little of the downside.
(ii) The regulatory authority itself is not legally liable for the economic consequences of
regulatory failure, in contrast to the quality control office of Holiday Inn, which is integrated
into an ownership structure which is fully liable for the economic costs of a quality lapse. The
costs which the regulatory authority does bear in loss of reputation and bureaucratic sanctions
by its government can be trivial compared to the economic consequences of regulatory lapses.
(iii) As the case of Thailand shows, regulatory lapses in one jurisdiction can damage other
jurisdictions, as contagion spreads from one market to another. However, the duty of any
national regulatory authority is to serve its national interest, not to worry about damage in
other jurisdictions, except insofar as this spills back to damage its own jurisdiction.
(iv) If a financial instrument is traded in several jurisdictions, market manipulation which
would be subject to criminal or regulatory sanction in one jurisdiction can be shifted to
another, less rigorous, jurisdiction. For the sake of attracting certification business, a
regulatory authority might go easy on conduct which damages only citizens of other
jurisdictions.
(v) If related instruments are traded in several jurisdictions, then this could undermine the
attempts of one regulatory authority to counter trading strategies which involve manipulation
of several markets. For example, Hang Seng Index futures have been used in a multi-
instrument strategy to manipulate Hong Kong's financial markets. The regulators of trade in
this index in other jurisdictions have no obligation or incentive to take account of the impact
of such manipulation on the Hong Kong economy. Indeed, they may perceive a business
opportunity in any tightening of settlement rules or disclosure requirements by the Hong
Kong regulatory authority.
(vi) There are few barriers to sovereign nations seeking entry into the low cost, high revenue
business of certification by providing a nominal location for incorporation and offshore
banking. The downside risk of loss of reputation and hence of future business is not much of
a disincentive to miniscule islands whose only economic resource is sovereignty, which they
can realize by selling low-cost certification to ethically-challenged corporations, alongside
their sales of postage stamps to philatelists. Indeed, the spectacular collapse of companies
incorporated on the island provides free advertising and attracts business from other
corporations seeking to minimize liability. For example, the Cayman Islands claims to be the
fifth largest financial centre in the world with confirmed bank deposits of US$0.5 trillion
(i.e., more than the deposits in the New York Federal Reserve District), 575 banks and trust
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companies (including the Bank of Credit and Commerce International before it collapsed in
the biggest banking scandal in history), 20,000 corporations (including LTCM). By law, a
bank inspector who asks to see the books of one of these institutions would be arrested.
INTERNATIONAL BANK SUPERVISION & REGULATORY ARBITRAGE
Firms which borrow internationally have novel ways to dress up their balance sheets, shifting
assets and liabilities amongst subsidiaries in different countries. International lenders have
been slow to learn how to interpret such balance sheets. International borrowers can also
book loans amongst subsidiaries located in different countries to exploit international
weaknesses in regulation, so that regulators with the capacity to scrutinize the books lack the
incentive or authority and vice versa.
Consider firm 1 based in country A which borrows from banks in countries A, B and C. By
making simultaneous loan applications to the banks in A, B and C, firm 1 can raise a number
of loans implicitly secured against the same assets without actually perjuring itself in any loan
application. These loans can be hidden in the balance sheet reported in country A by booking
them through subsidiaries in countries B and C. If firm 1 guarantees the loans, then these
guarantees should be recorded as contingent liabilities in its balance sheet. However, if
accounting standards in country A are poorly enunciated and enforced, then banks and
regulators will learn about the difficulties of firm 1 only when it is too late.
The situation becomes even murkier if firm 1 borrows directly from a bank in country A, but
that bank in turn borrows from a bank in country B. If the banks in country A are not closely
regulated and have obscure accounting, then the country B bank will find it difficult to
determine the quality of its loans.
The duty of country B's bank regulator is to guard against systemic collapse of banks
incorporated in country B. It has no authority to penalize firms and banks incorporated in
country A for lapses in accounts presented in country A. On the other hand, the authorities in
country A may have access to information about its firms and banks, as well as authority to
act against them, but it may attach low priority to ensuring full disclosure to banks
incorporated in country B: the financial health of country B's banks are not their
responsibility.
To address these problems requires international enforcement of accounting standards and of
rules on capital adequacy, plus international pooling of information about the income
statements and balance sheets of firms and banks. These requirements for a “new
international financial architecture” can be met only if nations surrender some sovereignty for
the common good.
INTERNATIONAL HERDING
Global economies of scale in information permitted financial firms to expand rapidly to
exploit international discrepancies in asset prices and returns. This outpaced their
development of the intellectual resources to assess asset quality in countries where regulation,
accounting and financial analysis were poorly developed. It also outpaced their development
of management systems to control risk effectively on a global scale. They therefore made
international investments decisions on the basis of a few macroeconomic parameters for a
country or region, plunging into asset classes from which quality surprises emerged only after
they had taken massive positions.
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This reliance on the attenuated data amenable to information technology, thin intellectual
resources and inadequate management systems exacerbated the tendency to herd in financial
markets: all international financial lenders tarred all companies in a given country with the
same broad brush. This forced that nation's government to defend its reputation amongst
international lenders, as if it had guaranteed the loans which its firms had in fact taken out
privately from international lenders. This involuntary guarantee shifted risk from private
borrowers and lenders to the nation as a whole.
When doubts about the quality of private loans to a nation surfaced, there was a herd-like
rush out of the assets of that nation, as the technical systems of all international lenders
responded in lockstep to changes in the same few macroeconomic parameters. Lacking access
to and confidence in the nation's internal procedures for recovering loans, international
lenders instead called upon their own governments to press the IMF into service as private
debt collector, pressurizing the borrowers' government, which was suddenly beholden to the
IMF for loans to support its exchange rate as international lenders became unwilling to roll
over their foreign currency loans.
"NATIONAL" CONTAGION AND MULTIPLE EQUILIBRIA
The term "contagion" has entered the lexicon of international finance to connote the spread of
fears about one country's financial system and currency to neighbouring countries. In addition
to this contagion across countries, contagion across firms within one country can arise via its
exchange rate. Thus, fears about the creditworthiness of some of country A's loans
denominated in, say, US$ can lead to an exit from currency A, lowering its US$ value, hence
the US$ value of the collateral of other US$ loans. This can lead to a self-fulfilling
cumulative downward rating of all of country A's loans.
Such "national" contagion can occur, even if most of the loans were originally in good
standing. If country A's private sector has incurred a large number of US$ loans, international
lenders could become alarmed that these loans would become unpayable if country A's
currency depreciated substantially. At this point, currency speculators with resources which
are large relative to A's foreign reserves could short A's currency, thereby precipitating a
panic collapse of its exchange rate as more and more lenders refuse to roll over their US$
loans. This can be true even if the borrowers would have had no difficulty servicing their
loans at the original exchange rate.
When a country's private sector takes out a large number of loans denominated in, say, US$,
there might be two possible equilibrium values of its exchange rate. In one equilibrium, the
local currency has a high value in terms of the US$, the US$ loans can be serviced and local
interest rates are the same as those in the US because lenders require no risk premium. In the
second equilibrium, the currency A has a low value in terms of the US$, all the firms in
country A which have taken on US dollar loans are at or close to insolvency, so they can roll
over their loans only by paying a high risk premium. This risk premium is required to
compensate lenders not only for the sudden high leverage of their debtors but also for their
perceived exposure to further currency risk. Despite its low exchange rate, the country cannot
export its way out of its problems in the short term because internal financial chaos makes
trade credit unavailable from an internal banking system whose equity base has eroded.
The currency speculators may claim that they have made their money only by recognizing just
ahead of everyone else that currency A is overvalued. In fact, their actions have shifted
country A from the high to the low equilibrium. They have made their money via short sales
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which capture some of the reduction in country A's income which their short sales have
brought about. Thus, it could be the duty of the government of an economy targetted by short
sellers to intervene in financial markets to keep it at the high equilibrium. Such was the duty
of the Hong Kong Government in late 1998.
Conversely, a country such as Malaysia which has been driven to the low equilibrium might
need to restrict international capital flows to shift its economy back to the high equilibrium.
Otherwise, given the pessimistic expectations which obtain at the low equilibrium, any
expansion of domestic credit to recapitalize the banking system and jump start the economy
with lower interest rates would result merely in flight of the credit created. Once confidence
had been restored by internal economic recovery, the risk premium in domestic interest rates
would fall and the economy could remain at the high equilibrium.
Thus, interventions such as those by Hong Kong and Malaysia should be evaluated on a case-
by-case basis without jumping to the conclusion that they violate some universally valid
economic principles.
GLOBALIZATION AND THE INTERNATIONAL MARKET ORDER
The globalization of finance has stretched to breaking point key concepts in the Western
model of political economy, which celebrates competition between autonomous individuals,
market exchange and the rule of law. Thus, the Western institutions whose under-use
undermined Asian finance threaten the global financial order through over-use.
Market Exchange and the Rule of Law
The loan contracts between the hedge funds and the money centre banks (such as that
between LTCM and UBS) are amongst the largest ever written. Such a contract is
qualitatively different from those governing normal economic life:
Intelligibility. Given the exposures of LTCM around the world and the complex way in which
they interacted, it is safe to say that the full implications of the contract were not grasped by
the signatories, let alone anyone else. Globalization had expanded the information processing
requirements beyond the capacity of any individual.
Enforceability. The contract was unenforceable because the obligations were so large that
triggering a default would have jeopardized world financial stability: hence the takeover of
LTCM by a consortium of the world's largest financial firms.
The Price Mechanism
In goods markets, prices convey information which lead to efficient resource allocation
because they are the medium through which market players interact. Players make private
tradeoffs taking account of the prices which they face; if all players face the same prices, then
the prices would convey information about the tradeoffs made by other players. Incomplete
markets undermine this because some social tradeoffs are not incorporated into private
tradeoffs; monopolies, because they distort price signals. The globalization of financial
markets has vitiated the price mechanism in the following ways:
(i) Asset prices fail to reflect fundamentals because private and social risk tradeoffs diverge
hugely as a result of the global application of bankruptcy and limited liability.
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(ii) Principal/agent problems mean that asset prices reflect agent decisions which are not
aligned with the interests of principals. In particular, the incentive structures which are
available to motivate financial agents preclude their focus on long-term fundamentals.
(iii) Herd behaviour on a global scale leads to asset prices which reflect traders' expectations
of future price movements or which reflect only the restricted set of signals upon which
players in that market choose to focus.
(iv) Informational economies of scale lead to global financial firms which are large relative to
the markets in which they trade, so that they can manipulate the key prices of entire
economies, such as their exchange rates and interest rates, rather than allowing these to be
determined by competitive market forces.
Distortions in asset prices, due to the effects noted above, have real effects by distorting real
investment decisions or by triggering institutional constraints designed to control credit risk,
for example, if they force sales of the underlying assets to meet margin requirements or if
they eliminate the equity base of a firm, thereby blocking access to credit, forcing liquidation
or leading it to take riskier gambles.
An example of the latter effect is the recent difficulties of Metallgesellschaft when it entered
into forward contracts to purchase crude oil to hedge its forward sales of petroleum products.
Although these contracts were intended not for speculation, but for exercise at maturity,
Metallgesellschaft received margin calls when the price of crude oil fell. The financial burden
of these margin calls disrupted company operations, forcing changes in top management.
Competition and Economic Equilibrium
A more basic problem is that the above considerations call into question whether the
globalization of finance permits any coherent economic outcome (equilibrium) at all.
Economic theory demonstrates that goods markets achieve a coherent outcome when
increased consumption brings diminishing marginal benefits, while firms are subject to rising
marginal costs (i.e., scale economies are absent). Under these assumptions, the expansion of
any individual's consumption or any firm's output is limited because the diminishing private
gain is eventually offset by prices which rise as other players compete for the same resources.
By contrast, individuals protected by bankruptcy and limited liability enjoy rising marginal
private benefits from taking larger gambles, while financial firms with informational
economies of scale enjoy a falling marginal cost. Therefore, financial markets can fail to
achieve a coherent outcome, instead fluctuating between:
(i) speculative excesses as individuals and corporations take ever-increasing gambles.
(ii) collapses due to the triggering of institutional rules on loan margins and capital adequacy
which were imposed to constrain this speculative behaviour.
The global financial crisis which began in 1997 shows that this is not an obscure theoretical
possibility, but a real problem.
Individualism
The Western model of political economy celebrates individual autonomy, allegedly in
contrast to the collective mind-set of Asians. Individualism has been taken to its logical
extreme with the globalization of finance, by exploiting the institutions of bankruptcy and
limited liability. In production, these institutions facilitated the collaboration of many
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individuals in risky new ventures. In finance, they can be perverted into a vehicle for evading
downside risk. This has been exacerbated by the globalization of finance, as risky trades are
executed through companies incorporated in minute islands whose governments feel no
responsibility to the corporation's creditors, let alone for global financial stability. The result
is that a few individuals with the intellectual power to see new patterns in economic
relationships beyond those captured and exploited in existing formal models can privatize the
upside of gambles large enough to be a significant percentage of world GDP, while globally
collectivizing their downside. Because of informational economies of scale, they can operate
through global financial firms on the same scale as whole nations, manipulating their key
prices while remaining outside the jurisdiction of any responsible regulatory authority.
